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Campaign Finance Disclosure and Section 527
of the Code: A Look at the District Court’s
Opinion in National Federation of Republican
Assemblies1
by Donald B. Tobin
Donald B. Tobin is an Assistant Professor of Law,
Ohio State University, Moritz College of Law.
I. Introduction
Recent amendments to section 527 of the code require
tax-exempt political organizations to disclose contributions
to and expenditures of the organization.2 If organizations fail
to make such disclosures, they lose the benefit of their taxexempt status. This article looks at the recent district court
decision involving section 527 and examines the ramifications of the decision for exempt organizations and for campaign finance reform advocates.
During the 2000 presidential primaries, Republicans for
Clean Air ran a series of advertisements attacking Senator
John McCain’s record on the environment and praising thenGovernor George W. Bush’s. Republicans for Clean Air
claimed that its advertisements were only “issue advertising”
and did not expressly advocate the election or defeat of a
candidate for federal office, and were not subject to federal
election law. Republicans for Clean Air claimed it was not
therefore required to disclose its contributors or its expenditures in any manner.
The advertisements sponsored by Republicans for Clean
Air were simply one example of what was seen as abuses by

1
In the spirit of section 527 and full disclosure, in my previous
employment I was an attorney at the Department of Justice and was part
of a team of attorneys involved in crafting the government’s position in
National Federation of Republican Assemblies v. United States (S.D.
A1a. 2001) (No. 00-759-RV-C). A more thorough analysis of section
527, and the constitutionality of campaign finance disclosure provisions
in the code will appear in the forthcoming winter issue of the GEORGIA
LAW REVIEW. See Donald B. Tobin, Anonymous Speech and Section 527
of the Internal Revenue Code, 37 GA. L. REV. (Winter 2003).
2
A political organization is defined as a “party, committee, association, fund, or other organization . . . organized and operated primarily
for the purpose of directly or indirectly accepting contributions or making
expenditures, or both, for an exempt function.” IRC section 527(e)(1).
Exempt function “means the function of influencing or attempting to
influence the selection, nomination, election, or appointment of any
individual” to a public office. IRC section 527(e)(2).
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tax-exempt entities seeking to influence federal elections.
The proliferation of independent expenditures during political campaigns and the difficulty in identifying the source of
those expenditures increased the pressure for reform of campaign regulations that apply to advocacy by political organizations. After the primary campaign, Senator McCain joined
with Senators Joe Lieberman (then a vice-presidential candidate) and Russ Feingold to craft legislation requiring the
disclosure of the names of contributors to, and expenditures
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of, what they termed “stealth PACs.”3 Because the Supreme
Court had previously struck down campaign disclosure provisions in the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) associated with issue advocacy,4 Senators McCain, Lieberman,
and Feingold took another approach. Senators McCain, Lieberman, and Feingold sought to use the tax code as a mechanism for requiring independent third-party organizations to
make campaign disclosures similar to those contained in
FECA. The senators accomplished this by amending section
527 of the Internal Revenue Code, the section that deals with
the tax status of political organizations. The reformers
amended section 527 and created campaign finance disclosure provisions in the tax code by conditioning tax benefits
on compliance with the disclosure provisions. After the proposed changes were enacted into law, opponents almost immediately filed suit attacking the constitutionality of the provisions and alleging that the disclosure provisions violated
plaintiffs’ First, Fifth, and Tenth Amendment rights.5
II. How Section 527 Operates
There are at least three possible ways to interpret section
527’s disclosure provisions. The government’s interpretation
views section 527 as an elective provision with two main
attributes. Under this interpretation, section 527(i) provides
organizations with a choice of whether they want the benefits
of section 527 tax-exempt status or not. If the organization
seeks the benefit of tax-exempt status under section 527, it
must file a designation to that effect with the Secretary of
Treasury.6 If an organization fails to file an election to be a
political organization under section 527, the organization is
taxed on its otherwise exempt function income (defined as
amounts received as a contribution of money or other property, membership dues, or proceeds from a political fundraiser).7 Second, once an entity registers as a section 527
organization, to be exempt from tax the entity is required to
file quarterly reports,8 and disclose its expenditures and con-

3

146 Cong. Rec. 55995 (daily ed. June 28, 2000) (statement of Sen.
Lieberman); see also S. 2582, S. 2583, 106th Cong. (2000).
4
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 43 (1976).
5
See National Federation of Republican Assemblies v. U.S.,
F.Supp.2d
, 2002 WL 2008245 (S.D. Ala. ) (Aug. 27, 2002) [hereinafter NFRA]. Plaintiffs include the National Federation of Republican
Assemblies, the Alabama and Mobile Republican Assembly, the Howard
Jarvis Taxpayers Association and political action committee, the Libertarian National Committee, and Paul Haughton. Id. at *1, note 1.
6
IRC section 527(i) (2002). An organization meets this requirement
by filing Form 8871, Political Organization Notice of Section 527 Status
with the IRS. Rev. Rul. 2000-49, 2000-44 IRB 430.
7
IRC section 527(c)(3), (i)(4) (2002). Under subsection (b) an organization’s income is taxed at the highest corporate tax rate.
8
If a regularly scheduled election is to be held during a specific
calendar year the political organization must file a quarterly report, a
pre-election report, and a post-general election report. IRC sections
527(j)(2)(A)(i)(I), (II), (III) (2002). If a regular election is not scheduled
for a particular year, an organization must file semi-annual reports. IRC
section 527(j)(2)(A)(ii) (2002).
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tributors.9 Specifically, subsection (j)(3)(A) provides that entities electing to be tax-exempt political organizations must
disclose the amount of each expenditure of $500 or more and
the name and address of the person to whom the payment
was made.10 And subsection (j)(3)(B) requires the disclosure
of the name and address of each contributor who contributed
in the aggregate $200 or more to the organization during the
calendar year.11
If an entity has elected to be a section 527 political organization by filing a notice under subsection (i) and it fails
to disclose under subsection (j), the entity is penalized (or
taxed) on the amount “to which the failure relates.”12 Under
the government’s interpretation of the statute, an entity can
elect to be a section 527 organization and disclose either
some, all, or none of its contributors and expenditures. Under
subsection (j), the entity would be taxed on those contributions or expenditures that it failed to disclose.
Plaintiffs, however, argue that all entities, even those that
choose to opt-out under 527(i), are subject to the disclosure
provision in subsection (j). They contend that the disclosure
provisions are therefore mandatory on all entities meeting
the definition of a political organization.13
A third option, not advocated by either party, is that an
entity has a choice whether to opt-in to the regulatory scheme
or not. If an entity opts-out, its income is taxed. If it opts-in,
it agrees to comply with the regulatory requirements of the
section and must disclose all contributions and expenditures.
Thus, subsection (j) applies to political organizations that file
with the secretary under (i), but not to other organizations
who chose to opt-out and pay the tax due under (i)(4). Under
this interpretation, (j) operates as a penalty to those organizations that opt-in but fail to disclose specific contributions
or expenditures. Thus, organizations have a choice whether
to opt-in, accept tax-exempt status, and comply with the
disclosure provisions in section 527, or opt-out, pay tax on
their income, and not disclose their contributors or expendi-

9
IRC section 527(j)(2) (2002). The organization makes this disclosure by filing Form 8872, Political Organizations Reports of Contributors and Expenditures, Rev. Rul. 2000-29, 44 IRB 430. The IRS was
also required to make the reports available on the Internet. IRC section
6104(a)(3)(2002). See http://eforms.irs.gov (IRS Web site listing disclosure reports for political organizations).
10
Expenditure is defined as “a payment, distribution, loan, advance,
or deposit, of money, or anything of value. . . .” IRC section 527(e)(4)
(2002), referencing IRC section 271(b)(3) (2002). If applied literally,
this definition would require the disclosure of amounts spent to purchase
office equipment.
11
IRC section 527(j)(3) (2002). Contribution is defined as “a gift,
subscription, loan, advance, or deposit, of money, or anything of value.
. . .” IRC section 527(e)(3)(2002), referencing IRC section 271(b)(2)
(2002). The information required in these reports is almost identical to
the information required in reports made by organizations pursuant to
FECA. See 2 U.S.C. section 434(a) (2002).
12
IRC section 527(j)(1) (2002).
13
Plaintiffs in National Federation of Republican Assemblies contend
that they are not just subject to tax on the nondisclosed amount but are
subject to criminal penalties under IRC section 7203.
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tures. Organizations may not choose to opt-in and then disclose only some contributions or expenditures.
III. District Court Decision
The district court took an interesting and sometimes confusing approach to analyzing the statute. Instead of analyzing
section 527 as one aggregate tax provision, it divided the
provision into two parts and considered the provisions in
subsections (i) and (j) independently. In a previous decision,14
it determined that subsection (i), which provides an organization must opt-in to the regulatory scheme or be subject to
tax on its income, was a tax provision and that plaintiffs could
not enjoin the collection of a tax under the Anti-Injunction
Act. The court further determined that subsection (j), which
requires exempt organizations to pay the top corporate rate
on any undisclosed contribution or expenditure, was a penalty, and that plaintiffs could properly contest the constitutionality of subsection (j).15 Therefore, the suit proceeded as
an attack only on the constitutionality of subsection (j).
In its recent decision, the district court concluded that the
disclosure provisions in subsection (j) are constitutional as
they apply to contributions to political organizations involved
in influencing federal elections, but unconstitutional as they
apply to organizations involved in only local or state elections. Moreover, the district court held that the expenditure
disclosure provisions are unconstitutional.
A. First Amendment Analysis
The court first recognized that subsection (j) applies only
to organizations that elect to be treated as section 527 organizations under subsection (i). Organizations that opt-out under
subsection (i) are taxable under (i)(4) on all of their income
including exempt function income, which includes contributions to the organization. The court noted that an organization
does not have a right to a tax deduction or tax-exempt status
and that Congress can condition a tax subsidy on an entity’s
willingness to comply with regulatory requirements.16 It thus
concluded that if Congress was conditioning a tax subsidy
on an entity’s willingness to comply with the disclosure
requirements, the traditional First Amendment campaign finance analysis under Buckley v. Valeo did not apply.17 The
court then examined subsection (j) to determine whether
Congress permissibly conditioned an entity’s tax-exempt
status on its willingness to comply with campaign finance
disclosure requirements.

exemption on an organization’s willingness to disclose campaign contributions. First, it concluded that campaign contributions could be treated as income for tax purposes, and
second, it found that by denying those benefits to organizations that failed to disclose contributions, Congress merely
removed its tax subsidy for those specific disclosures. It
therefore found the campaign contribution disclosure provisions in subsection (j)(3)(B) constitutional.18
2. Expenditures of Political Organizations
The court took a very different approach with regard to
the expenditure disclosure provisions. The court recognized
that under subsection (j) an exempt organization that failed
to disclose its contributions and expenditures could incur a
penalty (or a tax) greater than its income. Specifically, an
organization that failed to disclose both its contributions and
expenditures would be subject to a penalty of 57 percent.19
The court believed that subsection (j) as it applied to expenditures went beyond merely withdrawing a tax subsidy, since
the amount the exempt organization was required to pay
exceeded the amount of the subsidy. The court therefore
concluded that the First Amendment analysis in Buckley v.
Valeo and not the subsidy analysis in Regan v. Taxpayers with
Representation applied.20
In Buckley v. Valeo, the Court set out the traditional structure for analyzing Congress’s ability to require the disclosure
of campaign contributions and expenditures. The Buckley
line of cases indicate when individuals and organizations
must comply with the disclosure provisions in FECA. These
cases have established the traditional “issue advocacy” v.
“express advocacy” distinction. Express advocacy is defined
as communication containing express words of advocacy
such as “vote for,” “elect,” and “vote against.”21 Under the
traditional Buckley approach, it is express advocacy that can
clearly be subjected to campaign finance regulation.
Plaintiffs argued that because the communication here was
not express advocacy, under Buckley the disclosure provisions violated the First Amendment. The court rejected plaintiffs’ reading of Buckley but ultimately held that the expenditure disclosure provisions violated the First Amendment.
The court first rejected plaintiffs’ assertion that only express advocacy could be regulated consistent with the First
Amendment. It claimed that the issue/express advocacy dichotomy presented by plaintiffs was in fact incorrect, and

1. Contributions to Political Organizations
With regard to contributions to political organizations, the
court found that Congress permissibly conditioned a tax-

14
National Federation of Republican Assemblies v. United States,
148 F.Supp.2d 1273 (S.D. Ala. 2001).
15
Id. at 1280.
16
NFRA, 2002 WL 2008245, *11; Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S.
439, 451 (1991); Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540,
547 (1983); Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959).
17
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 43 (1976); NFRA, 2002 WL 2008245,
*11.
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NFRA, 2002 WL 2008245, *12.
For example, if an organization fails to disclose both contributions
and expenditures, the first $100 it receives will be taxed at 35 percent,
causing the organization to pay a tax of $35. Once the remaining $65
is spent, the organization must once again pay tax on that amount,
causing a tax of $22.75. The total tax on the $100 will be $57.75.
20
Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 547 (1983)
(“We have held in several contexts that a legislature’s decision not to
subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe the right,
and thus is not subject to strict scrutiny.”).
21
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44 n. 52 (sometimes referred to as magic
words “vote for,” “elect,” “support,” “cast your ballot for,” “Smith for
Congress,” “vote against,” “defeat,” “reject.”).
19
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that communication that was not express advocacy still might
not be considered issue advocacy.22 In other words, the absence of express advocacy did not necessarily constitute issue
advocacy. Instead, the court believed Buckley classified
speech into “issue discussion” and “advocacy of a political
result.”23 Advocacy of a political result, however, extends
further than the current definition of express advocacy. It was
this latter speech, speech advocating a political result, that
the district court believed could be regulated consistent with
the First Amendment.24
The district court recognized that in the context of provisions dealing with caps on independent expenditures, which
apply to expenditures “advocating the election or defeat of
[a] candidate,” the Supreme Court found the language unconstitutionally vague because “the distinction between discussion of issues and candidates and advocacy of election or
defeat of candidates may often dissolve in practical application.”25 The Supreme Court, therefore, created a bright line
test to ensure that individuals engaged in purely issue discussion would not find themselves inadvertently engaging in
speech that made them subject to the act. The issue/express
advocacy distinction presented just such a line.
The district court recognized, however, that the issue/express advocacy distinction was not universal. At most, it only
applies to organizations whose major purpose is not the
nomination or election of candidates for public office.26 Political committees, defined as organizations whose “major
purpose is the nomination or election of a candidate” may be
regulated even if they are not engaged in express advocacy
because their speech is “by definition, campaign related.”27
The court noted that political organizations are similar to
political committees because by definition section 527 organizations are created to influence the election of an individual to public office, and that Congress may constitutionally
require disclosure of political organizations even if they are
not engaged in express advocacy.28
But after the court concluded that political organizations’
speech could be regulated, it held that the expenditure disclosure provisions in subsection (j) were constitutionally deficient. The court concluded that under Buckley the regulation
must still “bear[] a sufficient relationship to a substantial
government interest” and that the expenditure disclosure provisions failed to satisfy such an interest. Specifically, the court
rejected the assertion that either the “informational interest”
or the “corruption rationale” that justified the regulation in
Buckley was present here.

22

NFRA, 2002 WL 2008245, *15.
Id. at *15-16, citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 79.
24
Id.
25
Id. at *16 citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 42.
26
Id.
27
Id. at *19-20, Buckley, 424 U.S. at 79.
28
Specifically, section 527 provides that a political organization is
an entity organized or operated for the purpose of influencing or attempting to influence the selection, nomination, election, or appointment
of an individual to public office. IRC section 527 (e).
23
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With regard to the informational interest, the court believed that the expenditure disclosure provisions did not satisfy an informational interest because they in no way tied the
contribution to a candidate. The court concluded that absent
such a tie the provision could not promote the informational
interest of “increas[ing] the fund of information concerning
those who support candidates.”29
The court reached a similar conclusion with regard to the
corruption rationale. The court acknowledged that Buckley
recognized that “disclosure requirements deter actual corruption,” but found that in this case the corruption rationale did
not apply because the expenditure disclosure requirements
do not require the disclosure of the candidate that benefits
from the expenditures.30 The district court therefore concluded that due to the attenuated risk of corruption when
independent expenditures are involved, there must be affirmative evidence in support of the government’s claimed interest.31 The court concluded that the “sufficiency of the government’s corruption interest is supported only in certain
applications, with vast portions of its reach unsupported by
the articulated interest.” Accordingly, it concluded that “section 527(j) is not narrowly tailored to serve the government’s
interest in combating actual or perceived corruption.”32
B. Fifth Amendment
In addition to arguing that section 527 violated the First
Amendment, plaintiffs also argued that the disclosure provisions violated the equal protection clause of the Fifth Amendment because the disclosure provisions do not apply to other
exempt organizations that may receive contributions or make
expenditures for the purpose of influencing elections.33 The
court concluded that statutory classifications are generally
valid if they bear a rational relation to a legitimate government
purpose, but that statutes that infringe on fundamental rights
are subject to a higher level of scrutiny. The court concluded
that the contribution disclosure limitations were subject to
rational basis scrutiny because the provision did not implicate
plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights, but the expenditure limitations were subject to strict scrutiny because they did implicate plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights.
The court then upheld the contribution disclosure provisions under rational basis scrutiny, but rejected the expenditure provisions under a strict scrutiny analysis. In applying
strict scrutiny, the court determined that under Regan Congress could have required all tax-exempt organizations to
disclose their expenditures, and that its failure to do so raises
Fifth Amendment concerns. The court further found that
because the government failed to establish that political organizations are sufficiently different from other exempt organizations in ways that justify treating them differently,

29

NFRA, 2002 WL 2008245, *24, citing Buckley at 81.
Id. at *25.
31
Id.
32
Id. at *26.
33
Id. at *26-27. Labor unions, social welfare organizations, and other
section 501 organizations are not subject to the disclosure provisions.
30
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527(j)’s expenditure disclosure provisions violate the equal
protection clause.34
C. Tenth Amendment
Section 527’s disclosure provisions specifically apply to
local and state electoral advocacy.35 Plaintiffs contended that
Congress does not have the power to regulate state elections
and that the provisions in section 527, as they pertain to
organizations involved in state and local elections, violate
the Tenth Amendment because Congress did not exercise its
taxing power when it enacted section 527(j). The district
court agreed with plaintiffs and concluded that Congress in
passing section 527(j) was not exercising its taxing power
but was instead attempting to regulate state and local elections.36 The court noted that section 527(j) was not designed
to raise revenue or aid in tax collection, but instead was an
attempt by the government to regulate elections. Finally, the
court noted that a political organization’s tax liability is not
impacted by the content of its disclosures or by the failure
to make disclosures (because it believes subsection (j) is a
penalty), and section 527(j), therefore, does not “assist in
determining the fact or amount of tax liability.”37
The court concluded that “while the taxing power authorizes Congress to legislate in an area otherwise reserved to
the states,” the statute at issue was not enacted pursuant to
that power. It stated, “[b]ecause section 527(j) is not a revenue
measure and does not serve any revenue purpose, the court
concludes that on its face section 527(j) reflects Congress’s
purpose to regulate state and local electoral advocacy.”38
IV. Commentary on Decision
The district court decision raises complex and important
tax, election, and constitutional law issues. Although the court
struck down the expenditure-related disclosure provisions in
subsection (j), the decision is a resounding win for the government and for election law reform advocates.
A. Subsidy Rationale
First, this case accepted the government’s argument that
Regan v. Taxpayers with Representation was the appropriate
authority for initially examining the constitutionality of the
provision, and recognized that contributions to an exempt
organization could be taxable to that organization as income.
By concentrating on the subsidy rationale in Regan, the
district court was able to uphold the contribution disclosure
provisions without resorting to an analysis under Buckley.
By accepting that Regan and not Buckley controls the case,
34
Id. at 32-33. This conclusion, however, appears to be somewhat
weakened by the court’s determination that section 527’s expenditure
disclosure provisions are unconstitutional. The court concluded that
“[w]hile the enforcement method chosen by Congress could not constitutionally have been imposed on other tax-exempt organizations without modification, the disclosure requirement itself could constitutionally
have been imposed on such organizations.” Id.
35
IRC sections 527(e)(1), (2).
36
Id. at 39.
37
Id.
38
Id.
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the district court acknowledged that significant campaign
finance reform provisions for exempt organizations will be
considered constitutional as long as the provisions are conditions on an organization’s exempt status.
In fact, even the court’s determination that expenditure
disclosure provisions are unconstitutional can easily be modified to address the court’s concerns. The court concluded that
due to the fact that contributions and expenditures could be
taxed (or penalized) under subsection (j), the amount paid
under subsection (j) could exceed the amount of the tax
subsidy. It found this fact dispositive as to why the subsidy
rationale did not apply to the expenditure disclosure provisions.
This concern, however, can be dealt with in three different
ways. First, subsection (j) could be amended to state that the
penalty imposed under subsection (j) may never exceed that
amount that would have been due under (i)(4). This ensures
that (j) only operates to eliminate that tax subsidy and does
not produce a penalty in excess of that subsidy. If Congress
so amended the statute, both the contribution and expenditure
disclosure provisions would be constitutional under the
court’s opinion.
Second, that the amount paid under (j) should never exceed
the amount owed under (i)(4) can reasonably be implied by
the current statutory scheme. Although the district court recognized and then disregarded the fact that an organization
should not end up paying more under (j) than it would have
paid under (i)(4), common sense tells us that this will almost
always be the case. An organization not wishing to disclose
contributions or expenditures will simply choose not to file
with the Secretary under (i) and will be taxed on its income,
including contributions, under (i)(4). It is only those organizations that plan on disclosing contributions and expenditures, but then choose not to do so in specific instances, that
are subject to subsection (j). Thus, an organization should
never be subject to a greater “penalty” (or tax) under subsection (j) than it would have had to pay under (i)(4). For if the
“penalty” under (j) would be greater than (i)(4), the organization would simply choose not to disclose any contributions
or expenditures and pay tax under (i)(4). Because it is reasonable to assume that Congress did not intend organizations
that partially comply with the statute to pay more than those
that do not, the IRS could issue regulations stating that the
payment required to be paid under subsection (j) shall not
exceed what would have been paid under (i)(4). Such a
reasonable interpretation of the statute would likely be upheld, and would ensure that section 527 as written would
come within the Regan subsidy rationale.
Finally, the court accepted that the relevant legal question
is whether the statute eliminates a subsidy or creates a penalty.
But in answering that question, the court looked at subsection
(j) by itself. It did not consider section 527 as a whole. If we
consider subsection (j)’s import as part of section 527, we
see that the statute as a whole falls within the subsidy rationale
in Regan.
Although the government has argued that subsection (j)
provides a choice to exempt organizations whether to disclose
October 2002 — Vol. 38, No. 1
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or not, it can also be seen as an enforcement mechanism
applicable to organizations that choose to opt-in to the regulatory structure. The statute as written provides that an organization may opt-in to the statutory framework by filing
with the Secretary or it may opt-out and pay tax on its
income.39 If it opts-in, it is then subject to the disclosure
requirements. Subsection (j) is not an attempt to provide more
options, but instead can be seen as a provision to enforce the
original decision to opt-in or not. Once an organization
chooses the benefit of tax-exempt status it must disclose.
Subsection (j) merely enforces that disclosure and requires
that organizations that fail to disclose pay the amount established in subsection (j).40 If this analysis is correct, section
527 meets the subsidy rationale because the subsidy is being
conditioned upon an organization’s willingness to comply
with the regulatory structure. Organizations that are not willing to do so must pay a tax under (i)(4). Organizations that
are willing to do so are exempt. Subsection (j) merely deals
with organizations that agree to comply with the statute, but
then do not do so. In that instance, the penalty may exceed
the amount of the subsidy. If it did not, all organizations
would choose to be exempt under (i) and then not disclose
under (j).
B. Buckley Approach
In addition to concluding that the Regan analysis is the
initial framework for considering the decision, the court also
supported the position of campaign finance reformers by
recognizing that the issue/express advocacy standard promoted by plaintiffs was not the proper standard under Buckley. The district court believed that speech advocating a
political result could be regulated under Buckley even if it
was not express advocacy, and specifically rejected the idea
that the absence of express advocacy was issue advocacy.
This decision opens the door for scholars and litigants arguing
for a middle ground between express and issue advocacy.41
Campaign finance reform advocates may be less thrilled
with the court’s analysis of the government’s interest in regulating campaign activity. The court recognized that the speech
at issue here could be regulated consistent with Buckley if it
satisfied an important government interest. It rejected, however, that the interests presented in Buckley, namely the information interest and the corruption rationale, were present

39
An organization that wishes to opt-out is not required to notify the
IRS of that choice. All organizations that file to opt-in are subject to
tax.
40
If Congress did not require some type of penalty on undisclosed
expenditures under (j), section 527 organizations could obfuscate the
purposes of the act by disclosing all contributions and no expenditures.
It is often unhelpful to know who funds an organization if one does not
know who the organization supports. This problem is partially rectified
by Federal Communication Commission rules that require political
television advertisements to carry the name of the sponsor of the advertisement. See 47 U.S.C. 317 (2002); 47 C.F.R. 73.1212.
41
Professor Edward Foley has recently suggested that an advertisement that compares two political candidates should be considered an
election advertisement for FECA purposes. See Edward B. Foley, “Smith
for Congress” and Its Equivalents: The Importance of Chamber of
Commerce v. Moore, forthcoming in the ELECTION LAW JOURNAL.
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here. In this regard, the court failed to recognize that both
the information interest and the corruption rationale were
present here and were sufficient to establish important government interests.42
First, the court appears to conclude that the information
interest was not served here because the statute was not strong
enough. The court concluded that because the disclosure does
not tie a specific expenditure to any candidate it does not
satisfy the informational interest present in Buckley. This,
however, ignores that although the expenditure disclosure
provision may not in and of itself disclose who the expenditure supports, the disclosure along with knowledge of the
expenditure does. For example, knowing that the Fund for a
Great America spent $50,000 on advertisements does not
necessarily promote the informational interest in Buckley, but
knowing that the Fund spent $50,000 on advertisements attacking a specific candidate does. Absent the disclosure provision in section 527, it might be impossible to tie the advertisement to the Fund for a Great America. It is the combination
of the disclosed information with public information that is
already available that promotes the government’s informational interest.43
Next, the court concluded that the expenditure disclosure
provision does not satisfy the government interest in preventing corruption. In this regard, the court required convincing
evidence that the disclosure provisions were necessary to
prevent corruption. Even if this standard is correct, a point
that I think is highly debatable, there is clearly convincing
evidence that undisclosed expenditures by political organizations can have a corrupting influence on the electoral system. In fact, the advertisements by Republicans for Clean Air
that shot life into the current reform effort highlight the
corruption potential. Absent disclosure provisions it would
have been impossible to compel Republicans for Clean Air
to disclose the source of its funds.44 The source turned out

42
See Landell v. Vermont Public Interest Research Group, 300 F.3d
129 (2002) (finding strong enough corruption and information interests
for far stricter campaign finance restrictions than those present here).
43
Recent scholarship indicates that disclosure provisions, even as
they apply to organizations not officially affiliated with a candidate,
satisfy important informational interests because they provide voters
with clues as to which organizations or individuals support various
candidates. These clues help voters establish candidates’ positions and
empower voters. See Elizabeth Garrett, The Future of Campaign
Finance Reform Laws in the Courts and in Congress, Chicago Public
Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 19, at 11-13 (forthcoming
27 OK. CITY. U. L. REV. __ (2002)) (“Voting cues must provide accurate
information to voters in order to empower them: that is, the limited
information that citizens obtain must allow them to draw correct conclusions . . . ”).
44
After some pressure, Sam and Charles Wyly disclosed that they
were the sponsors of the advertisements. The Wyly brothers spent $2.5
million on the advertisements praising then-Governor Bush and attacking Senator McCain. Charles Wyly was also one of President Bush’s
“pioneer” fund-raisers and raised at least $100,000 for the president’s
campaign. He and his brother also each contributed $100,000 to the
Bush-Cheney Inaugural Committee. Michael Petrocelli, “Bush Names
Wife of Campaign Supporter to Kennedy Center,” Houston Chronicle,
Apr. 11, 2002 at A5.
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to be a long-time friend of President Bush. Moreover, the
wife of one of the sponsors of the commercial was recently
appointed to the Kennedy Center Board by President Bush.45
It is just this type of appearance of corruption that disclosure
provisions are intended to address.46
C. Tenth Amendment Analysis
With regard to the court’s Tenth Amendment analysis, the
court’s conclusion that Congress was not exercising its taxing
authority is puzzling. Under Regan, Congress may choose
not to subsidize through a tax exemption political organizations that fail to disclose contributors and expenditures. There
is no reason why Congress should be required to subsidize
such organizations if they fail to comply with disclosure
provisions simply because the organizations are engaged in
state and local advocacy. Such an interpretation would in
effect force Congress to provide a tax exemption to state and
local political organizations. These organizations have no
more right to such an exemption than organizations involved
in advocacy at the federal level.
Moreover, the court’s Tenth Amendment analysis shares
the same error that the court made in striking down the
expenditure limits. The court examines subsection (j) independently to determine that it is not a tax provision. Subsection (j) must be examined as part of section 527. If the entire
section is considered, the provision is clearly an attempt by
Congress to eliminate tax subsidies for organizations that fail
to comply with the disclosure provisions. It does not matter
that significant revenue is not raised by the particular statute.
The provision helps create fairness and equity in the code by
preventing taxpayers from subsidizing organizations engaged
in secret political speech.47

45
Charles Wyly’s wife, Caroline Wyly, was appointed by President
Bush to serve on the John F. Kennedy Center Advisory Committee on
the Arts. 38 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 615 (Apr. 15, 2002).
46
The legislative history surrounding the amendments to section 527
also indicates that Congress was concerned with the potential for corruption posed by undisclosed campaign expenditures. See 146 Cong.
Rec. S5995 (daily ed. June 28, 2000) (statement of Sen. Lieberman)
(“None of us should doubt that the proliferation of these groups — with
their potential to serve as secret slush funds for candidates and parties,
their ability to run difficult-to-trace attack ads, and their promise of
anonymity to those seeking to spend huge amounts of money to influence
our elections — poses a real and significant threat to the integrity and
fairness of our elections.”). Moreover, according to Public Citizen,
political organizations are now being used and controlled by candidates
to promote their candidacies. To the extent that these organizations are
not involved in express advocacy, they contend that they are not subject
to FECA. Public Citizen identified 61 members of Congress who have
political organizations and the top 25 political organizations collected
approximately $30 million in a two-year election cycle. See “Congressional Leaders’ Soft Money Accounts Show Need for Campaign Finance
Reform Bills,” Public Citizen, at 1, Feb. 26, 2002.
47
The court’s Fifth Amendment analysis has no impact on the decision. The court concluded that if the disclosure provision violates the
First Amendment it also violates the Fifth Amendment, and if it can
withstand First Amendment scrutiny it also survives Fifth Amendment
scrutiny.
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V. Conclusion
In all, campaign reform advocates should be pleased with
the district court’s decision in National Federation of Republican Assemblies. The court accepted the government’s position that a tax-exempt organization’s tax status can be conditioned upon the entity’s willingness to comply with
campaign finance disclosure provisions. In fact, the court
indicated that the reasons for upholding the statute in this
instance may be extended to regulating other tax-exempt
organizations. Thus, the tax subsidy rationale from Regan
will continue to provide a framework for campaign finance
reform as more and more tax-exempt entities engage in political advocacy.48
Moreover, the court, in interpreting Buckley, used a more
flexible test and rejected the issue/express advocacy dichotomy that so many courts are currently using. By recognizing
that speech other than express advocacy can be regulated
under Buckley the decision increases the chances that disclosure provisions will be upheld even outside of the exempt
organization tax subsidy framework.
To the extent the court struck down the disclosure provisions, the alleged infirmities can easily be fixed. Congress
can amend section 527 and clarify that the penalty under
subsection (j) can never exceed that amount that an organization would have had to pay had it not chosen to be an
exempt organization. Alternatively, Congress can clearly set
out the government’s informational and corruption interests
that justify campaign finance disclosure provisions.
The most immediate impact of this decision, however, is
to give credence to the IRS’s current push to require political
organizations to comply with section 527.49 The district
court’s decision clearly requires that organizations involved
in political advocacy at the federal level wishing to be taxexempt comply with the notice provisions in section 527(i)
and the contribution disclosure provisions in subsection (j).
Section 527 organizations would therefore be wise to comply
with the IRS’s current regulations until a final decision is
reached in this case.

48
To the extent organizations are now trying to conduct political
advocacy through other exempt organizations, such as (c)(4) organizations, the district court opinion should give them pause. If the perceived
abuse by section 527 organizations is transferred to 501(c)(4) organizations, Congress can, under the district court’s logic, expand the
disclosure provisions to cover other exempt organizations.
49
IRS News Release IR-2002-84 (July 1, 2002) (warning political
organizations that they have only 15 days to submit past-due or corrected
items); IRS Notice 2002-34, 2002-21 IRB 990 (IRS announcement of
voluntary compliance program to promote disclosure by political organizations).
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